Анализируя основные идеи представителей феноменологической психиатрии и экзистенциального анализа и выстраивая панораму их формирования и развития, автор включает рассматриваемую традицию в философский контекст XX века.

Hasidism is a religious-mystical trend in Judaism that arose in the first half of the eighteenth century. among the Jewish population of Volyn, Podillya and Galicia. The emergence of a new movement in the Orthodox Jewish religion was driven by changes in the socio-economic and political status of Ukrainian Jews during that period. Cossack uprising under the leadership of B. Khmelnitsky 1648 - 1654, Gaidamachchyna and other national disturbances of the XVII - XVIII centuries. greatly undermined the well-being of the (...) Jewish population, led to a deepening of property and social stratification within communities, a weakening of intra-community discipline, a decline in the authority of religion and the prestige of rabbinic science. In Volyn, Podillya and Galicia, most affected by hostilities, the overall cultural level of the people is significantly reduced, Talmudic science is declining, and schools are being closed. (shrink)

Judaism is one of the oldest religions that has survived to this day. It is a religion of mostly ethnic Jews, a nation that, for many historical reasons, was scattered all over the world and for a long time did not have a permanent place of residence, its state. During the century of its existence Judaism has undergone a number of changes, but its main features - monotheism and the veneration of ancient religious books - have not lost yet.

The purpose of the article is to reveal the anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy. The anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy allows considering the noogenesis from the perspective of philosophical traditions, which is much richer in comparison with the history of scientific knowledge about the psychology of meanings. The being of Dasein-psyche in the meaning of "philosopher’s soul" was firstly mentioned by Plato in "Phaedo". The anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being reveals the ontological orientation and limits (...) of the being of Dasein-psyche within the being of Dasein-the-One, as well as the intellect, knowledge and techne, as the arete existentials. Theoretical basis of the study is built on Heidegger’s fundamental ontology and methods of neurophilosophy. Originality lies in exploring Dasein-psyche through the neurophilosophical approach. In the context, Dasein-psyche is revealed as a part of the whole or the image, created from Dasein-Y-Matter as a paradigm. It is formed by the factors and causes of complication, as well as by the experience of being of the previous states of matter. Conclusions. In conclusion, the anthropologization of Dasein-psyche’s being by methods of neurophilosophy allows considering the noogenesis from the perspective of philosophical traditions. The essence of a person is revealed as the arete existentials, which require further rethinking and clarification. (shrink)

In connection with the analysis of ancient Indian, in this case Rivedian, ideas about a person, it is necessary to clarify the words used to indicate them. Taking into account the developed synonymy of the Vedic language, T. Elizarenkova, among the several concepts that have the highest number of synonyms in the Rig Veda, refers to the term "human" / "man" / "husband". One of these words is purusha (púruṣ a- and its equivalent “metrical extension.” The semantics of the word (...) purusha in the RV, though not widely used in the monument, are important in the context of considering a person's concept of both the RV and subsequent Indian texts. as well as to study purusha formation as one of the basic philosophical concepts of the Upanishads and the Sankhya school. (shrink)

The World abounds with infinite crimes, technogenic accidents, acts of nature, etc. And very often, speaking about infringement of laws, use a word "anarchy". In consciousness of one people this concept associates with fear, personifies something mad, uncontrollable, and not giving in to the control. In consciousness ofothers - it means permissiveness, impunity for any acts and even crimes. The philosopher, in my opinion, is the avocate of a historical value and validity. And consequently it is necessary to observe these (...) principles in relation to any concept or the theory. The philosophical, political doctrine of anarchism sets as the purpose clearing of the person of pressure of any authorities and any forms of economic, political and spiritual authority. Aspiration to anarchy as thementality, meets already at cinics and in early christianity, and also in chiliastic sects of the Middle Ages. Occurrence of the philosophical theory of anarchism connect with names of German thinker Max Shtirner (Caspar Shmidt's pseudonym, 1806–1856), French philosopher Pierre-Joseph Prudon (1809 – 1865) and the largest theorists of this doctrine of Michail Bakunin and Peter Kropotkin. Humanistic value as a red string passes through all political doctrine of anarchism and, in my opinion, should be presented fairly in order to prevent substitution of concepts and with the purpose of observance of historical honesty. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Decision-Making as a Broader ConceptJacinta O. A. Tan (bio), Anne Stewart (bio), and Tony Hope (bio)KeywordsCompetence, decision-making, capacity, anorexia nervosa, autonomy, values, identityWe thank Demian Whiting for the thoughtful critique of aspects of our paper (Tan et al. 2006a). A primary aim of our research was to provide empirical grounds on which to stimulate discussion about the nature of decision-making capacity (DMC). Whiting criticizes in particular the concept of (...) 'pathological values' that we suggested might be relevant in the assessment of DMC and in the related issue of deciding when a patient's refusal of beneficial treatment should be overridden.Whiting's central concern is with DMC. Whiting argues that the absence of pathological values should not be a criterion for DMC. We are unclear whether he is also arguing that pathological values do not provide a reason of any kind for overriding treatment refusal. At the end of the paper he writes: "we cannot justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values... on the grounds that these patients lack DMC" (2009, XX). This seems to leave open the possibility that we may be able to justify compulsory treatment of patients who have pathological values on grounds other than that they lack DMC. As we wrote in our response to the discussants of our original paper, "The primary issue for us is whether the reasons for refusal to which we draw attention provide grounds for overriding refusal, and if they do how they can be characterized in such a way as to avoid the ever-present danger of simply overriding autonomy in a patient's best interests" (Tan et al. 2006b, 300).In deciding on whether to use compulsory treatment, there are other relevant factors that may need to be considered, such as the seriousness of the decision, which determines the threshold for competence. However, in this response we consider three issues. First, we argue that the current concept of DMC is by no means so clear cut or generally agreed upon as Whiting implies, and that some of the lack of clarity relates to pathological values. Second, that the concept of DMC is itself dependent on accounts of autonomy, and that it is plausible that pathological values can affect autonomy. Third, we directly consider the question of whether a coherent account of pathological values might be given based on a concept of authenticity.The Current Criteria for DMCWhiting argues that the current criteria for DMC are correct and that an additional criterion along the lines of absence of pathological values should not be added. This argument assumes that there is a clear and agreed understanding of the current criteria. We believe this is not the case for three reasons.(i) Whiting begins his account of DMC by saying that it is normally taken to include: "(1) [End Page 345] understanding (and appreciation)" (2009, 341). Already there is an area of dispute, and the use of parentheses reflects this. The concept of 'appreciation' was developed by Grisso and Applebaum (Grisso, Appelbaum, and Hill-Fotouhi 1997). It is not included in either English common law development, for example (ReC), nor in the criteria specified in the Mental Capacity Act 2005. More important, Grisso and Appelbaum in their comment on our original paper (2006) argue that our work advances thinking about 'appreciation' rather than requiring that we add new elements. The implication is that they believe that what we have called pathological values are relevant to the assessment of capacity and are already included in an account of capacity that incorporates the criterion of 'appreciation.' In our response, we argued that pathological values are not entirely captured within the account of appreciation that Grisso and Appelbaum had previously given. We do not want to revisit that issue here, but the point of relevance is that on one view (that of Grisso and Appelbaum) pathological values are already included in the current criteria for DMC as part of the concept of appreciation, whereas on Whiting's view they are not.(ii) Even if there were agreement over the wording and concepts relevant to DMC there is a further important issue: how are those concepts... (shrink)

Nemám v úmyslu předložit školsky umný referát o filosofování, o různých filosofických koncepcích a jejich argumentaci, nýbrž pokusím se otevřít otázky, které mě bytostně zaměstnávají. Moje torzovité a fragmentární podněty se budou týkat následujících otázek-problémů: 1. Ontická realita na našem vnímání nezávislého světa a gnoseologické meze ontologie. 2. Co je racionalita, jaké jsou její možnosti a meze? Lze racionalitu kotvit gnoseologicky či již ontologicky? Jaký je vztah mezi racionalitou, přirozeností a přírodou? Je iracionalita předchůdná racionalitě? 3. Lze z racionality odvodit (...) etické jednání? Je racionalita vázána na určitý kulturní kontext a diskurs, či je universálně lidská? 4. Nemožnost objektivity a nezbytnost úsilí o co nejvyšší možnou míru objektivity. 5. Na čem založit humanitu? A proč vůbec humanita? 6. Posléze načrtnu svoji thesi: Skutečnost‚ její poznání a její utváření jako proces komplexity a komplementarity komponent v korelacích v kontinuitě a v kontextech. (Těmito šesti K si z Vás nechci dělat slovíčkářskou srandu, ale je to to nejvážnější, oč mi jde a s co Vám chci sdělit.) 7. Skončím položením radikálního otazníku nad filosofií. (shrink)

This paper discusses the development of self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century compared with the same development in the natural sciences. The author characterizes this stage of philosophical historiography as the “revolution of relativity.” This movement of self-consciousness was apparent in not only the humanities but also the natural sciences at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries. Awareness of probability is a fundamental achievement of non-classic physics, which has since reversed its paradigm. In contrast (...) to the Newtonian scheme, quantum theory introduces the category of probability and insists that we can talk about certain physical phenomena only in a probabilistic mode and that the method of observation affects the phenomena observed. Consequently, any “object-subject” and “subject-subject” interaction involves the experience of the researcher, which thereby affects the results. The same model of interpretation lies at the basis of the turn toward self-consciousness in the history of philosophy of the 20th century. The classical history of philosophy is built on idealization and gives an objective description of the philosophical process. Following the other sciences, the philosophy of the 20th century understood that historical and philosophical reality largely depends on the historians of philosophy; that such reality is constructed by certain means; that there is a certain kind of historical and philosophical work; and that, with different strategies, methods and approaches, we obtain different results that are complementary to each other. The 20th century was a time of competing interpretations rather than gradually progressing historical and philosophical systems. This stimulated the search for own ideal of objectivity. For philosophical historiography, this is the hermeneutic ideal of the structural analysis of text or architectonic reconstruction. The historicalphilosophical revolution of relativity promotes the development of critical historiography and revises the foundations of its classical tradition. (shrink)

The subject of personal identity has received substantial treatment in contemporary African philosophy. Importantly, the dominant approach to personal identity is communitarian. Bernard Matolino's new book Personhood in African Philosophy enters into this discussion by way of contesting some of the assumptions underlying communitarian approaches. His own critical assessment leads him to what I believe is an unprecedented objection in the literature; the conclusion that communitarian philosophers are involved in a category mistake when framing the question and articulating the notion (...) of personhood. I intend to present a brief summary of the chapters of the book and reflect on some of the main philosophical issues that the book provokes, noting what I take to be refreshing insights that Matolino brings to the discussion while also engaging critically with the ones I find most contentious. In particular, I briefly assess Matolino's implicit suggestion that an Akan inspired quasi-physicalist account of mind avoids the mind-body interaction problem; I object to the category mistake charge on behalf of communitarians; and lastly, I raise questions about, and propose ways Matolino can refine, his proposal concerning a new way of thinking about personhood, which goes under the rubric of Limited Communitarianism. (shrink)

In this article, the author analyzes the concept of religious foundations of culture and power as a problem of Russian political consciousness. The paper reveals the patterns of interaction between the religious and political traditions of the Russian Empire in the early 20th century. The author provides Bargradsky project case as a unique example of such influence, identifying its mean in the later Russian Empire’s political history. Philosophical-political case that is analyzed in the article makes it possible to trace the (...) inner links between religious attitudes and political imagination of Russian monarchical circles and to identify the peculiarities of religious and political self-awareness of Russian power, its mechanisms for the selecting the ideas, symbols, images of the national political, religious and artistic culture in the last period of the Russian Empire. From our point of view, it would be most effective to combine the cultural-historical and the philosophical and historical approaches both in the reconstruction of Bargradsky project and in studies of Russian political culture. The article examines both the political conditions of activities and spiritual-cultural goals of Bargradsky Committee on Bargradsky project in Italian Bari as well as in Saint Petersburg in the 1910s. The author discusses the religious concept of Russian political culture, applying philosophical-historical method for the analyses Bargradsky Committee activity and its attempt to slow down the degradation of the Russian autocracy. The major emphasis is placed on the political and philosophical way of analysis as well as on the possibility of introducing the results of philosophical-historical research into current debates on the issue of alternatives to Russian history. (shrink)

The article seeks to explore the mindset of young émigré poets of the 1920s–1930s, to identify possible ideological influences on the literature and literary criticism of the first wave of Russian emigration and to determine the spiritual origins of the ‘Paris Note.’ Among many other influences on the young émigré poetry (Henri Bergson, Nikolai Berdyaev, Vasily Rozanov, Nikolai Fedorov and others) the influence of Lev Shestov’s philosophy is particularly evident. However, it manifested itself not directly but indirectly, mainly through the (...) Parisian critic Georgy Adamovich, who, unlike young poets, read Shestov carefully and appreciated him very highly. The philosophy of Adamovich’s poetry, which brought to life the phenomenon of the ‘Paris Note,’ had many parallels with Shestov’s thoughts. Hence the unexpected concordance between the central issues and artistic practice of the participants of the ‘Paris Note’ and Existentialism emerging in the 1930s in the literature of France. (shrink)